

Electoral Performance of Religiopolitical Alliance (IJI) in Election 1988: An Assessment

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Abstract

The creation of Pakistan was the result of Islamic ideology. The Muslims were demanding a separate homeland where they would apply the teachings of Islam. Following Pakistan's establishment, the principles of Islam were included in the constitution-making process in the form of an Objective Resolution. The Constitutions of 1956, 1962, and 1973 were all based solely on Islamic principles. Any laws that were considered to be anti-Islam were firmly rejected by the public at large, resulting in severe agitation. When the socialist Pakistan People's Party tried to re-emerge in Pakistan's political arena in 1977, Islamic ideology proved to be a binding force against PPP, prompting the formation of the Pakistan National Alliance. In 1988, the socialist PPP returned to Pakistani politics, and supporters of Islamic ideology, including the military, government, and religious political parties, formed an alliance against her, forming Islami Jamhuri Ittehad. IJI took part in elections but did not win the support of the voters. Now the question is why IJI, Pakistan's largest religious-political alliance, was unable to defeat the PPP, a single

political party. What were the reasons behind its failure? How the PPP dealt with opposition strategies in elections, including the President, Military, and IJI? What were the real causes of PPP's success in the elections? The answers of these question are the real motive of this research.

Key words: Islamic Ideology, Objective Resolution, Socialist PPP, PNA, IJI, Military

Introduction

The year 1988 saw a number of twists in Pakistan's political history that altered the country's entire political structure. President Zia disbanded Junejo's government and dissolved all assemblies in May 1988, which was the first political event.¹ The second twist in Pakistani politics occurred three months later, when President Zia died in an airplane crash on August 17, 1988.² After eleven years of dictatorial rule by Zia, the Pakistan People's Party formed a government in the National Assembly and occupied the office of Prime Minister in November 1988, marking the first woman Prime Minister in the Islamic world.³ All of these political changes altered Pakistan's political environment and had a major effect. After the sudden demise of President Zia, Ghulam Ishaque Khan⁴ was nominated as the caretaker President of Pakistan and Mirza Aslam Baig was designated as new Chief of Army Staff.⁵ In the current political scenario of 1988, the newly appointed COAS General Aslam Baig refused to participate in existing politics and told politicians that the Army had no intention of being active in the political system and would stay away from it; he agreed that "it was the only domain of politicians."⁶ Ghulam Ishaque Khan, the new caretaker President, announced the date of the new election and stated that it would be held on November 16, 1988. The declaration of the final date accelerated the pace of political activity. Political parties have relaunched their campaigns with a new sense of zeal and enthusiasm. This political momentum was enhanced when the Supreme Court found in favor of the PPP on a writ filed by the opposition, ordering that election 1988 be held on a party basis and declaring

that non-party elections were a violation of the public's constitutional rights.⁷ President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's caretaker government declared its impartiality in the upcoming election and assured all political stakeholders that the election will be held on time and on a free and fair basis. However, several political parties, including the PPP, JI, and PML (J), expressed concerns about the impartiality of the caretaker government and demanded its removal before the election. These parties were concerned that the current caretaker government was formulated by President Zia and could be biased in the election, so they requested the appointment of neutral Ministers.⁸ Their demand was rejected by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. The PPP was also wary of the military's possible involvement in the elections. Despite the military's assurances of neutrality and impartiality, the PPP leadership realized that if politicians failed to fulfill their political duties or if the law and order situation worsened during the election process, the Army might change its mind.⁹ As a result, the PPP leadership was extremely cautious in their speeches and addresses during the election campaign.¹⁰ On the other hand, some conservative groups continued to push for military involvement in this election because they believed that a military government would be preferable to a restoration of the PPP;¹¹ and those groups were unwilling to accept PPP's government. In reality, the PPP's victory was a nightmare for those who had been targeted and agonized under Z.A. Bhutto's authoritarian rule. They had a hard time forgetting the terrifying memories of that time.¹² PP's previous communist policies terrified industrialists and business people, who were forced to hand over all of their factories, mills, and industry to the government under the guise of nationalization policy;¹³ although religious-oriented sacred groups saw the socialist PPP as a threat to consecutively Islamic ideals and traditions.¹⁴ The feudal lords also opposed PPP because they had already given up their land under Z.A. Bhutto's agricultural reforms under the previous PPP administration, despite Benazir Bhutto's pledge that her party would not implement such reforms.¹⁵ Many people involved in Bhutto's murder suspected that she would seek revenge against her father,

which Benazir Bhutto repeatedly denied.¹⁶ However, there was still a significant upper class that was fearful of PPP's return and attempted to prevent PPP from regaining control. In reality, the success of the PPP among the general public indicated that the party would win the upcoming election; hence, the elite class was attempting to protect their interests.

Formation of Islami Jamhuri Ittehad

M. K. Junejo agreed to reorganize the Pakistan Muslim League after taking the oath as Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1985. Junejo was elected president of the newly reform PML by a large number of elected officials who gathered under the banner of the PML. General Zia did not respond to the new political situation, but when the PML entered parliamentary politics and attempted to limit the President's authority, Zia responded by deposing the elected government in 1988. Following the dissolution of Parliament, the PML was once again engulfed in a political crisis. On the issue of leadership, she split into two parties.¹⁷ One group supported Junejo while other was in the favor of Fida Muhammad Khan. The second group was politically more powerful because Chief Minister of the Punjab, Mian Nawaz Sharif was the general secretary of that group. After a long dictatorial rule, elections were to be held on a party-by-party basis, and every political party was eager to participate in the election and try to win. With a poor administration and low public support, the PML (Junejo group) established the Pakistan People's Alliance (PPA) with the aid of Tehrik-i-Istaqlaal and Jamiat Ulma-i-Islam before the election of 1988.¹⁸ After some days, Jamaat e Islami and nine other small political groups amalgamated in that alliance and a new electoral alliance named Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) came into being.¹⁹ IDA was formed to cope the political tactics of Socialist PPP in the election but surprisingly, the major political party of this alliance, PML (J) parted away just after eleven days and joined Islami Jamhuri Ittehad , another electoral alliance, headed by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi.²⁰

Indeed, as previously mentioned, the influence of the Socialist PPP was growing among the masses prior to the 1988 election. PPP has become the

most successful political party in Pakistan thanks to Benazir Bhutto's charismatic leadership. Her campaign slogan, Roti, Kapra, or Makan, was also effective in attracting voters. In the face of PPP's strong political position, PML agreed to join a large electoral alliance against the party, and on October 6, 1988, nine political parties, including the PML (Fida group), formed Islami Jamhori Ittehad.²¹ Junejo later joined the united PML (F) and PML (J), and he was nominated as president of the unified PML, while Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was nominated as the alliance's leader. The other political parties of the alliance were as under:

Pakistan Muslim League (Fida group) (PML-F)

Jamaat e Islami Pakistan (JI)

Nizam e Mustafa Group (NM)

Jamiat Ulma e Islam Pakistan (Darkhawasti group) (JUI)

Markazi Jamaat e Ahl e Hadith (Moulana Lakhvi group) (MJH)

National People's Party (NPP)

Jamaat e Mushaikh Pakistan (Sahibzada Fazal e Haq group) (JMP)

Independent Parliamentary Group (IPG)

Hizb Ullah Jihad (HJ)²²

The list of IJI coalition parties revealed that it was a coalition of right-wing political and religious parties, with nearly all of them sharing conservative views, implying that the alliance was formed solely to counter the socialist PPP's political power in elections. The establishment of this alliance was also said to be based on the advice and support of the military.²³ It was said that Director General ISI General Hameed Gul was the real founder of this coalition and two other high profile military officers including Brigadier Imtiaz and Major Amir supported him.²⁴ The basic purpose of this alliance was to keep away the socialist PPP from power.²⁵ IJI selected "bicycle" for election symbol²⁶ and distributed her new manifesto in public on November 8, 1988 just before the commencement of elections.²⁷ IJI coalition also faced numerous problems on the issuance of party tickets. The IJI is made up of over nine large and minor political parties. When the IJI leadership began

distributing party tickets to candidates, both major and minor parties began to oppose this form of ticket distribution. In reality, every party in that alliance was trying to gain the greatest number of party tickets; even the alliance's smallest and weakest party was seeking the largest and most significant share of the seats.²⁸ The demand for a large share of tickets from each IJI coalition party was causing problems for IJI leadership, since the alliance's influential leadership wanted to win as many seats as possible in that election at any expense. They want to offer preferential treatment to electable candidates for party tickets because they can win the most seats for any political party due to their huge permanent vote bank, extensive personal relationships, vast wealth, and dominant character in national or provincial politics, so the IJI leadership could not ignore those electable. The question now is how they can satisfy both of the IJI coalition's partners on the issue of party ticket distribution. It was likely that a significant number of politicians who were unable to obtain IJI party tickets would declare their candidacy as independent candidates, dividing the IJI vote bank against PPP candidates. It would not only reduce the chances of winning seats, but it could also hurt the IJI alliance's unity. The topic of party ticket allocation has posed a serious problem for the IJI leadership. After several days of debate among the IJI alliance's leadership, the general secretary of IJI announced a detailed ticket distribution plan on October 18, 1988. Tickets were allocated among alliance parties in different percentages according to that schedule. Sixty-five percent of tickets were allocated to the PML,²⁹ fifteen percent to NPP and JI,³⁰ and the remaining tickets were distributed to other coalition parties such as JAH, JUI, and IPG.³¹ Before the election, a significant number of electable joined the unified PML, and the platform of the unified PML was used to award party tickets.³² Two mainstream political parties including Pakhtun Khawa Milli Awami Party and Awami National Party did not join any alliance and decided to contest election independently.³³ JamiatUlma e Islam and Jamiat Ulma e Pakistan also distributed party tickets independently and refused to become the part of any electoral alliance.³⁴ Similarly, in Sindh, the

MQM did not form an alliance and its candidates took part as independents in the elections.³⁵

Pakistan People's Party and Issue of Party Tickets Distribution

PPP had a lot of problems with party ticket allocation before the election. In reality, three types of candidates were striving for party tickets. The first were those who had been members of the MRD coalition parties since the 1970s, and Benazir Bhutto had promised them that the PPP would contest elections with the help of the MRD coalition parties. These parties were now seeking a share of seats in the election, creating a problem for the PPP leadership.³⁶ PPP was the largest and most mainstream political party in the MRD alliance, while other parties were made up of tiny regional or language-based groups. Those groups have no effective role in national politics; but now those small groups were demanding big share of seats (more than 50 percent share of the total seats) which was not possible for PPP leadership.³⁷ So PPP differed with their “illogical” claims and declared it “unacceptable.” To keep the unification in alliance, PPP presented an adequate formula for coalition parties and offered each party three to four seats of National Assembly but that formula was rejected by MRD Parties.³⁸ Now PPP decided to contest election without any alliance and announced that every party of the alliance would participate in election on individual basis. PPP left the coalition, and the MRD alliance came to an end on October 19, 1988.³⁹ Benazir Bhutto, the PPP's chairperson, explained that MRD was not an electoral alliance. It was created solely for the purpose of restoring democracy, and it should be disbanded once that aim has been achieved. She also claimed that the PPP would not run a candidate against any MRD leaders, and that if the PPP wins the election, she will appoint them to her cabinet.⁴⁰ Her point of view, however, did not sit well with the coalition partners.

The second main issue faced by PPP on distribution of party tickets was the rejoining of former PPP leaders in the party and their demand for party tickets. During the resistance movement against General Zia's dictatorial rule, the majority of the PPP's senior and influential leaders left

the party and joined other political parties or formed their own organizations. The majorities of them took part in 1985's election as individuals and were elected. These electable types of politicians have a special significance in the electoral process, and any political party cannot ignore them because of their huge permanent vote bank, vast personal connections, countless resources, and prominent character in politics. As a result, the PPP took the same measure, and before the election, the party's chairperson declared that all such individuals were welcome to rejoin the party.⁴¹ A significant number of former politicians, including MNAs and MPAs, rushed to the PPP in order to rejoin the party and obtain party tickets. PPP is now brimming with those types of members who were desperately looking for party tickets. The third thing that the PPP had to deal with was the demand for party tickets from deep-rooted, faithful, and loyal party members. Those workers have been with the party since its creation and have remained loyal to it throughout its ups and downs. However, when Chairperson PPP started distributing party tickets to former electable, discomfort among party loyalists developed. They argued that the PPP's socio-economic manifesto should be more respected and significant than the electable because of their sacrifices and struggle against dictatorial rule.⁴² However, since the Chairperson of the PPP was determined to win in every election, she favored the electable and forgotten old faithful and trustworthy companions. The party was also frustrated by the ticket allocation policy.

Election 1988; Results and Formation of the Governments

Various political parties began their election campaigns late due to various reports and rumors of the election being postponed. In fact, following President Zia ul Haq's dismissal of Junejo's government, Junejo filed a writ petition in the Lahore High Court challenging the illegal dissolution of the assemblies. The court had already stated that government removals were illegal, but it also ordered those new elections be held on November 16, 1988. Junejo filed a new writ petition in the Supreme Court, and the case was now before the Supreme Court, where both political parties and their

representatives were awaiting the court's final decision. Starting their election campaign before the Court's final judgment could jeopardize all of their political efforts if the court rules in favor of restoring Junejo's government. So, they were waiting for final judgment and later, when Court declared its judgment and endorsed the verdict of Lahore High Court; it was too late for those political parties to start a strong and effective election campaign in that short time. That act of political parties decreased the momentum of election campaign.

Furthermore, the terrible and calamitous situation in the Punjab province caused by stormy floods was the second strong reason for the expected election postponement. A massive disaster and calamity have erupted in many districts and hundreds of tehsils across Punjab as a result of this stormy heavy flood, disrupting the momentum of the election campaign across the province. The disastrous situation sparked rumors of the election not being held on schedule, and it was assumed that the election would be delayed due to the disastrous situation. Simultaneously, the worsening law and order situation in Sindh was making it difficult for politicians in the province to launch a peaceful political campaign. The worsening law and order situation was also posing a challenge to the Election Commission of Pakistan's ability to conduct a free, fair, and transparent election in Sindh. As a result of this situation, reports of an election postponement were at an all-time high. Beside that disastrous situation in Punjab and worsened law and order situation in Sindh, some prominent political leaders leading by President Islami Jamhuri Ittehad Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was also amenably demanding the deferment of the elections. Certain politicians argued that, given the catastrophic and dangerous situation in Punjab and Sindh, it was impossible for them to launch a stable, appealing, and successful political campaign in the country's two most significant provinces. However, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Mirza Aslam Baig were both adamant about holding elections on time, and despite all rumors, elections were held on November 16, 1988, for the National Assembly, and three days later, on November 19, 1988, for all four

provincial assemblies of Pakistan. Elections were held for 205 Muslim seats in the National Assembly and 10 non-Muslim seats, with 20 seats reserved for women. Those party-based elections were held after Zia ul Haq's eleven-year dictatorship, so the public was fully engaged in the voting process. There were dozens of political parties competing in that race, but the real contest was between the IJI alliance and the PPP, which represented two opposing ideologies with opposing political views. The followers of Bhuttoism and Ziaism were contesting that election face to face. It seems a battle between rightist and leftist. In the end, the socialist PPP defeated the conservative IJI and formed a government with the support of independents and coalition partners. The results of that election were as under:

Name of the Contesting Party-----	
Seats obtained	
Pakistan People's Party -----	92
Islami Jamhori Ittihad-----	55
Muhajir Qaumi Movement-----	13
Jamiat Ulema e Islam-----	08
Awami National Party -----	03

Pakistan Awami Ittihad-----	03
Baluchistan National Alliance-----	02
National People's Party-----	01
Pakistan Democratic party-----	01

Independents-----	
27	
Vacant-----	
02	
Non-Muslim Seats	
Pakistan People's Party-----	
10	
Women Seats	
Pakistan People's Party -----	
12	
Islami Jamhuri Ittehad-----	
05	
Muhajir Qaumi Movement-----	
01	
Jamiat up Ulema e Islam-----	
01	
Independents-----	
01	

According to the results, PPP emerged as leading political party in National Assembly while Islami Jamhuri Ittehad captured second position. Mutihadda Quami Movement secured third position. The differences in the seats of PPP and IJI enhanced the importance of MQM and independents members. Another amazing feature of the election result was the defeat of religious political parties, which could not win substantial seats. Except for the PPP, IJI, and MQM, all other smaller, regional, or ethnical political parties, as well as all smaller electoral alliances, were completely eliminated from national politics.⁴³ Several senior and heavy-weight leaders, including Former Prime Minister of Pakistan Muhammad Khan Junejo, President IJI Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, founding member of PML (J) Hamid Nasir Chhattah, Secretary General of Islami Jamhuri Ittehad Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, key leader of Jamaat Isalmi Liaqat Baloch, including Raja Zafarul Haq, Aslam Khatak,

Naseem Aheer, Maulana Jan Muhammad Abbasi, and other prominent politicians, were surprisingly unable to win their personal seats, and the public harshly rejected them.⁴⁴

Results of Provincial Assembly of the Punjab

	Name of the Contesting Party -----
Seats obtained	
	Islami Jamhuri Ittihad-----
	108
	Pakistan People's Party-----
	94
	Independents-----
	32
	Pakistan Awami Ittehad-----
	02
	National People's Party-----
02	
	National People's Party (K) -----
01	
	Jamiat Ulma e Islam-----
01	

Results of Provincial Assembly of the Sindh

	Name of the Contesting Party -----
Seats obtained	
	Pakistan People's Party-----
	67
	Mutahida Qaumi Movement-----
	26
	Independents-----
	05
	Islami Jamhuri Ittehad-----
	01

Punjabi Pakhtum Ittehad-----

01

Results of Provincial Assembly of the NWFP

Name of the Contesting Party-----

Seats obtained

Islami Jamhuri Ittihad-----

28

Pakistan People's Party-----

20

Independents-----

15

Awami National Party-----

12

Jamiat Ulama e Islam-----

02

Results of Provincial Assembly of the Baluchistan

Name of the Contesting Party-----

Seats obtained

Jamiat Ulama e Islam (F) -----

11

Islami Jamhuri Ittihad-----

09

Independents-----

07

Baluchistan National Party-----

06

Pakistan People's Party-----

03

Pakistan National Party-----

02

Jamhuri Watan Party-----

01

Following the completion of elections in all four provincial assemblies, both main stream political parties (PPP and IJI) began efforts to form governments in all provinces, but divided and mixed mandates prevented them from achieving their goals. IJI won the most seats in Punjab, so Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (IJI) formed a government with the support of independents. In Sindh, the PPP won a majority of seats, and Syed QaeemAli Shah (PPP) formed a government with the support of the MQM. In NWFP, the IJI wins the most seats, but with the support of the Awami National Party, Aftab Ahmad Sherpao (PPP) became Chief Minister, and in Baluchistan, Zafar Jamali of the IJI became Chief Minister after forming a coalition with other smaller parties.⁴⁵ It was incredible that no political party could win an absolute majority in any province, and the fragile governments of the PPP and IJI were largely reliant on their alliance partners, who had been granted kingmaker status and were now in a position to blackmail the PPP and IJI at any moment.. Besides the leadership of IJI, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Military establishment were also very disappointed from the results. In fact, none of them had anticipated such a surprising result. Following the eighth amendment to the Constitution, the President now has the power to appoint any member of the house as Prime Minister, who must seek a vote of confidence from the same house after the appointment.⁴⁶ Following the socialist PPP's victory in the National Assembly, it was clear that Benazir Bhutto, the chairperson of the newly elected house's leading political party, would be nominated as Prime Minister by President. However, Ghulam Ishaq Khan purposefully tried to stall Benazir Bhutto's appointment as Prime Minister in the National Assembly until she agreed to all of his demands. According to Prof. Ghafoor Ahmad, Benazir Bhutto accepted all their demands. She promised that her party would nominate and support Ghulam Ishaq Khan as next Presidential candidate in coming Presidential election. She also promised that her government would not

interfere in security matters, such as security gadgets agreements. She also agreed that the PPP would not prepare Pakistan's foreign policy without the President and Chief of the Army Staff's approval, and that Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan (Senator) would be appointed as Foreign Minister of Pakistan.⁴⁷ She also agreed that her government would not rollback Pakistan's atomic program, and would continue the support of Afghan Mujahideen."⁴⁸ Although the PPP was willing to meet almost all of the establishment's demands, the military found it difficult to accept her administration. According to Mitra, "In the formation of PPP's government it is supposed that the American had skipped a crucial facilitator role. It was said that American envoy Robert B. Oakley met with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Military Chief Aslam Baig and other leadership of the prominent political parties to bring the PPP and military closer. The Americans acted very important role for the transfer of power. The American envoy visited Pakistan just after elections, and it was reported that "he gave future policy guidelines to Benazir Bhutto which she had accepted without any hesitation. Even the Federal cabinet was chosen with the consent of the Robert B. Oakley, Ishaq Khan, and Aslam Baig. Later the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard Armitage and Richard Murphy (his counterpart in State Department) arrived Pakistan to give final shape to that understanding,"⁴⁹ IJI's leadership also played an important role in that delay of federal government's formation. In fact, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the key leader of IJI and supporter of establishment; wants to form all provincial governments before the establishment of federal government. For this purpose, he arranged a meeting with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and tried to convince him that if he will establish federal government before the formation of Provincial governments than there was a strong chance that all independent candidates and smaller parties could flock towards PPP which would enhance the problems for him to establish IJI's government in provinces especially in the province of Punjab. Ghulam Ishaq Khan realized the situation and he intentionally delayed the nomination of PM in the

National Assembly and in the meanwhile, IJI set up her governments in the province of the Punjab and Baluchistan.⁵⁰ He was successful in his move. After the establishment of Provincial governments; President Ghulam Ishaq Khan asked Benazir Bhutto (Chairperson PPP) to make the government in National Assembly.⁵¹ Benazir Bhutto made its governments with the collaboration of MQM and she secured 148 votes from the house of 237.⁵² Next day election for "Speaker and Deputy Speaker" held and Malik Meraj Khalid elected as speaker of National Assembly.⁵³ Same day Ghulam Ishaq Khan was elected as President for next term.⁵⁴ He defeated Nasrullah Khan, Ahmad Jaffar and M. Nauroz Khan⁵⁵ and got 348 votes from Senate, National Assembly and all Provincial Assemblies except provincial Assembly of Baluchistan; which did not participate in election because it was dissolved by General Musa on Dec. 15, 1988.⁵⁶

Reasons of the success of PPP and defeat of IJI

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won elections and formed governments at both the national and provincial levels. During the elections, the IJI alliance tried its best to prevent the PPP from gaining power, but it was unsuccessful. Despite the military's financial support and the President's patronage, IJI was unable to overtake PPP as the winner. Political scientists were amazed at how the PPP defeated the largest and most powerful religiopolitical electoral coalition on its own, despite the fact that its chairperson, Benazir Bhutto, was a newcomer to politics with little experience, and she was contesting elections for the first time in Pakistan. She had to leave Pakistan when she was very young, shortly after her father's martyrdom, and she returned in 1986, just two years later, to take the oath as Prime Minister of Pakistan. According to the social scientist, it was Benazir's charismatic presence that enthralled people, who voted for the socialist PPP over the conservative IJI. She was the first female candidate in Pakistani politics to run for the position of Prime Minister, Pakistan's highest office. It was stunning for ordinary voters, especially women voters, who were a large part of Pakistani society but were never allowed to come forward and participate in the election process. Benazir

Bhutto was elected as the leader of Pakistan's 56 percent population in the 1988 elections. Women in Pakistan have warmly welcomed and embraced her, believing that she is from their country and represents them in Pakistani politics. PPP won elections, and ordinary women's involvement in the election process played a significant role in that achievement. Aside from Benazir's own personality, the sympathy element surrounding her father's judicial assassination was also a plus in those elections. She used the argument for political scoring in her campaigns. Rooti, Kapra, or Makaan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's popular electoral slogan, helped her win the sympathy of the poor and common citizens. The previous ban policy of Zia on political activities in the country had disappointed prominent politicians, who took part in the 1985 party-free election with a broken heart, but now they have the opportunity to run in a party-based election. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, at Benazir Bhutto's request, has allowed them to reveal their association with their political parties. They will now publicly participate in political events. They chose PPP to IJI because they still see IJI as a continuation of the Zia regime. The essence of Pakistani voters is that they still want a change in government, and it has only happened very rarely in Pakistan's electoral history that the winning political party has returned to power. The voters noticed that the IJI's main leadership had ruled Pakistan for several years, especially in Punjab, and that the PPP was in opposition in the form of MRD. Ordinary Pakistanis were aware of MRD workers' political contributions to the restoration of democracy in the country. Their sacrifices, devotions, dedications, and loyalty to the democratic system were not hidden from anyone. As a result, voters opted for reform and voted for the PPP in the election. Military, on the other hand, formed the IJI alliance. Its real purpose was to acquire and safeguard military interests, not political objectives. While the Chief of Army Staff initially showed his lack of interest in politics, the fear of PPP revenge remained. They were scared that if PPP got absolute majority in National Assembly, she could make such laws which could curtail the power of Army. So, they created the IJI alliance to keep the

PPP out of control or to limit its power. It was for this reason that every political party in that alliance was untrustworthy of the others. The majority of the alliance parties were only formed as a result of military pressure. Those parties have no political intentions or collaboration with each other. Every party in that alliance was trying to save its own political interest. It was for this reason that Jamaat e Islami opposed MQM's inclusion in the IJI alliance, fearing that it would jeopardize Jamaat e Islami's political interests in Karachi and Hyderabad. As a result, she attempted to hold MQM out of the IJI alliance. The same was true in NWFP, where Jamaat e Islami and the ANP had been bitter rivals for decades. The MQM's seat adjustment in Karachi and the ANP's seat adjustment in NWFP could reduce Jamaat e Islami's political power in those provinces. As a result of Jamaat e Islami's opposition, both political parties, ANP and MQM, ran separately in those elections, bolstering the political strength of the PPP against the IJI alliance. Aside from the MQM and ANP's withdrawal from the IJI alliance, six major religious parties have declined to participate, demonstrating that the IJI was an alliance of religious political parties, not a representative of all religious political parties. The Jammat e Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat, Jamiat e Ahle e Hadees Pakistan, Jamiat Ulma e Islam Darkhasti group, Jamiat Ulma e Islam (F), Tehreek e Inqilab e Islam, Tehreek e Nifaz e Fiqa Jafaria were the religious parties which showed their alienation from IJI alliance and contested elections independently. It is a fact that those religious political parties have a sufficient vote bank throughout the country, especially Jamaat Ahle e Hadees, which represents the Ahle e Hadees's vote bank, and Jamaat Ahle e Sunnat wal jmaat, which represents the Sunny vote bank, and both parties have consistently received a significant number of votes during elections. Similarly, Tehreek e Nifaz e Fiqa Jafaria has a significant influence on Shia votes, and the group has a distinct identity among Pakistan's religious political parties. Both three religious parties ran their own candidates in the 1988 election and did not support IJI, reducing the overall vote for IJI candidates. The alienation of those six religious parties from the IJI alliance demonstrated that

the IJI alliance did not serve all religious parties. The presence of every party, in every constituency, on every seat was another major factor in IJI's election defeat. IJI allocated party tickets to its alliance partners, but many candidates who were unable to obtain party tickets ran for office under their own party symbol. It divided the vote bank of IJI candidates, allowing the opposition candidate to lead. PPP benefited from the vote bank's division and won by a large margin. Owing to the split vote bank, dozens of IJI candidates lost their seats by the least margins. The IJI leadership was unable to manage this deficiency, and the PPP took the lead in those districts, increasing its seats in the assemblies. Another factor in IJI candidates' election loss was the previous parliament's poor and disappointing performance, which was elected on a party-line basis by General Zia. That parliament was made up of politicians from various cultural, linguistic, and regional backgrounds. Those politicians were demanded by the Zia government, but they were unable to speak on national issues because they were focused locally. The performance of that parliament was non-existent, which had an effect on the IJI's performance as well, since most of the IJI's popular representatives were already members of that parliament. Voters were not ready to choose them again so they preferred PPP on IJI candidates.

Conclusion

After a long struggle of MRD parties for restoration of democratic and political system in Pakistan; election held in 1988 on party basis. The victory of PPP in those elections stunned everyone because all competent authorities and national policymakers attempted to defeat PPP and established IJI to do so; however, the President's, establishments, and religiopolitical parties' efforts went in vain when PPP emerged as the largest and most powerful political party in the National Assembly. In the beginning, the victory of PPP shocked the establishment but latterly, they managed it and allowed the PPP's leadership to make the government on federal level. Aside from the military, the President played a critical role in the formation of the government. IJI said that the elections were rigged, but its voice was so insignificant that no

one cared. Elections were conducted under the supervision of the President and the Military, and rigging accusation refers to a charge levelled against those two institutions, which may create more challenges for the IJI leadership. As a result, rigging allegations emerged, albeit in hushed tones. PPP won because of its long struggle for democracy, which lasted more than two decades, while IJI was a creation of the establishment and was created solely to weaken PPP's Street power. During the elections, voters were split between Bhuttoism and Ziaism. Bhuttoism was the symbol of democracy while Ziaism was the mark of sequel of establishment. Voters supported democracy for National Assembly and rejected Ziasim while the provinces gave divided mandate to both political parties. The biggest province of Punjab had a split mandate, with the majority of people voting for Nawaz Sharif and the PPP coming in second. Sindh was the Bhutto family's home province, so the PPP took the lead there, while the NWFP and Baluchistan had split mandates, and neither the PPP nor the IJI were able to achieve an absolute majority. After a long period of dictatorial rule, democracy had been introduced in Pakistan and a party-based democratic government was finally established. The people of Pakistan had attached high expectations and hopes for the restoration of democracy but President Ghulam Ishaq Khan disappointed them and terminated all assemblies just after two years of its establishment which boosted political instability in Pakistan and none political powers used that instability for gaining their objectives and allowed the army to maintain its strength vis a vis the political arena as the press was also severely curbed. The lack of confidence between government and establishment, highly unsatisfactory governance and disturbed situation in Sindh helped in the strengthening of non-elected institutions. The democratic and other institutions failed to act within their prescribed limits and the government was sidelined as the President and the military started managing various affairs of the state. All this eventually came to a head and resulted in the Prime Minister's ouster from office.

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³Benazir Bhutto was the first women prime minister of the Pakistan as well as the first Prime Minister of the Islamic world. After the death of Zia,

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