

Reasons behind the rising wave of Religious Extremism and Domestic Terrorism in Pakistan: A Study in Context of Post 9/11 Pak-US Partnership

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Abstract

This article assesses the post 9/11 period and Pak-US partnership in the war against terrorism. It explores the assumptions that Pakistan's troubles increased after becoming ally of USA. It argues that militants, militant organizations all take this partnership against Islam and Pakistan becomes a worst victim of a domestic terrorism. The concept of *Jihād* in Islam is negatively used by the militant organizations against the state. It then goes on to illustrate that Musharraf's enlightened moderation failed and *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-ie-Mohammadī* reactivated. The article ends with the impact of peace deal with militants that proved a bad idea.

Keywords: Terrorism, Pakistan, USA, Militants, Post 9/11

Introduction:

In spite of all its efforts to please USA, Pakistan failed to satisfy it and by March 2002 US military personnel were engaged directly in operations in

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the name of assisting Pakistan security forces in apprehending and eliminating Tālibān and Al Qāidah. For safeguarding US interest, Pakistan had sacrificed many of its own perceived interests. The obvious example of this is Pakistan's support for Bonn process under which government of Hamid Karzai came into being. The Karzai Government with its strong allegiance with Northern Alliance could hardly be termed friendly regime for Pakistan. Northern Alliance had a history of close ties with India. In power struggle of Northern Alliance with Tālibān, Pakistan had always been with Tālibān. Pakistan's attempt to establish a moderate Tālibān government in Kabul after fall of old Tālibān regime was aborted by US. As a result Pakistan has no other option except to support Karzai government and it pledged \$100m aid to Afghanistan for reconstruction.²

Pakistan became victim of terrorism

Though Pakistan reaped the fruits of economic support of USA but it faced the repercussions of its policies immediately. The narrative of pan Islamism and Muslim brotherhood created by military establishment in 1980s and afterwards to address its security concerns began to backfire. General Musharraf's policies to support USA were not supported by people of Pakistan. It was said that Musharraf was pushing Pakistan to the war of outsiders and that the war was fought for the benefit of USA. Legitimacy of War on Terror was challenged.

Militant Organizations began to target Pakistan

After 9/11 militant organizations, born and thrived under State's overt and covert support in 1980s, turned on Pakistan. The most important of

² Shamshad Ahmad, "Post-9/11 Foreign Policy of Pakistan." *Criterion Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (2013).

militant organizations is *Sipāh-e-Ṣaḥabah* Pakistan (SSP) which was established in *Jhang* in 1985 to eliminate Shias. The organization was established with the support of General Zia. Other militant organizations like *Leshkar-e-Taiba*, *Leshkar-e-Jhangvī*, and *Jaish-e-Mohammad* were off shoots of SSP. SSP were involved in anti-Shia violence in 1980s and 1990s. *Baitullāh Mehsūd* the deceased head of *Tehrīk-e-Tālibān* Pakistan was originally from SSP.

Leshkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), an anti-Shia organization, was established in Bakkhar (Southern Punjab). After 9/11 it sided with *Tālibān* and Al-Qāidah. With *Tehrīk-e-Tālibān* Pakistan it has been involved in terrorism with in Pakistan.

Jaish-e-Mohammad, (JeM) another off shoot of SSP is basically working with Kashmiri Muhajideen for independence of Kashmir from India. India had to release its leader Masood Azhar when Indian Airline was hijacked by terrorists in 1999. JeM has links with Al Qāidah and Tālibān.

Leshkar-e-Taiba (LeT), also called *Jamat ul Dawa*, is an anti-Indian militant organization and is established in Muredkey (Punjab). India accused *Leshkar-e-Taiba* for involvement in Mumbai attacks of November 2008.³

Tehrīk-e-Nifāz-e-Sharī'ah *Mohammadi* (TNSM), another militant organization was established in 1989 in Dīr (with Head Quarters in *Bajawure* FATA) with the aims to enforce *Sharī'ah* in Swat. In 1994 TNSM led an armed struggle for enforcement of *Sharī'ah* but could not succeed. After US attack on Afghanistan it fought against US and NATO forces.

³ Apra Vaidya, "The 26/11 Mumbai Terror Attack." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 21, no. 4 (2017): 98-109.

The militant organizations increased unchecked as military establishment (Army and Inter-Services Intelligence) considered them as an asset during 1980s and 1990s, not only for defense of Pakistan (against rival India) but also for making Pakistan a regional power.⁴ These organizations were helpful against India. In Afghanistan these were supporting Tālibān for establishment of *Sharī'ah* there. With Tālibān in Afghanistan, Pakistan could rely on Afghanistan in time of need.

Mujahedeen or militants from the entire world (especially from Central Asian countries Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia) gathered in Afghanistan to fight against USSR. A rich Arab Osama Bin Laden also contacted Afghan Mujahedeen for assistance. He helped them and established himself in Afghanistan. After defeat of USSR the task was not achieved completely. Afghanistan was yet to be occupied by Tālibān (Mujahedeen began to call themselves Tālibān which literally means students). Afghanistan went to civil war as Tālibān and Northern Alliance (of Afghan warlords) fought for power. Tālibān came out as winner and established their government in 1996. Tālibān along with foreign militants began the task of enforcing *Sharī'ah* in Afghanistan and literally shook the world with their barbaric practices. They cut the hands of thieves, women were punished if they found roaming the streets without their *Mehrams* (close male relative), men were punished for shaving their beard, ancient

⁴ Siddiq, Ayesha. "Pakistan's Modernity: between the Military and Militancy." *Economic and Political Weekly* (2011): 61-70.

statues of Buddha and other carvings were destroyed, girls schools were destroyed and women were confined to their houses.⁵

Foreign militants established themselves in Afghanistan and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan during 1980s and 1990s. They married local tribal women. FATA (due to nonexistent of State control) became a Disney land for terrorists (Salman, 2012). In 2008 number of foreign fighters in FATA according to President Musharraf was 500-600, Prime Minister *Gilānī* 1200, Interior Minister 8000, and Additional Chief Secretary of FATA 18,470. Among them were Saudis Uzbeks, Chechens, Egyptians, Yemenis, Algerians, Tunisians, Libyans, Iraqis, Jordanians and Chinese Uyghur. However, at present the number of foreigners has reduced significantly due to *Zarb-e-Azb* (Operation that Pakistan Army has started in North Waziristan against militants).⁶

Militant outfits increased in number and strengthen even after 9/11. The period of post 9/11 also saw in originating of another and the most dangerous militant outfits *Tehrīk-e-Tālibān* Pakistan (TTP). One of the basic reasons of creation of TTP was operation *Lāl Masjid* in Islamabad. *Tehrīk-e-Tālibān* Pakistan (TTP) came into being on 13 December 2007 by a union of 40 militant leaders belonging to FATA, Frontier Regions and districts of Pakistan. *Baitullah Mehsūd* was chosen emir of TTP, whereas Mullah Umar, head of Afghan *Tālibān* at that time, became the supreme leader of the organization. The estimated size of the group is 30,000 to

⁵ Minaskshi Das, "Taliban's war on women: live experiences of Afghan women in transit on ethnicity and their identity." (2004).

⁶ Umbreen Javaid, "Operation Zarb-e-Azb: A Successful Initiative to Curtail Terrorism." *South Asian Studies* (1026-678X) 30, no. 2 (2015).

35,000. The group belongs to Deobandī sect of Islam with anti-Shia leaning. Aim of the group was to enforce Islamic system in Pakistan and in the entire World, to fight imperialistic powers in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the World and to fight state of Pakistan and its army.⁷ TTP became the most powerful organization in the sense that it rocked the country with suicide attacks. It is active in targeting official buildings, infrastructure, security forces, check posts, markets, Railway Tracks, Mosques of Bralivī, transmission line, Shia Mosques, Gas Pipelines, Schools etc. It targeted General Headquarter of Army in Rawalpindi. It was also accused of killing Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan. The aim of TTP is to refrain government of Pakistan from supporting USA, as well as prevent the government from taking any action against Tālibān and Al Qāidah in Pakistan.

The things were getting out of control. According to Shamshad Ahmed, Pakistan's former foreign secretary, Musharraf Government had to keep balance between US demands and expected backlash from militant outfits active in Pakistan.⁸ Bomb blasts, sectarian killings, kidnapping and violence broke all previous records. An environment of fear and uncertainty took the country in its grip.

According to Dawn newspaper the human cost of War on Terror that Pakistan had borne from 2001 to 2011 was death of 35,000 people along

⁷ Sadia Sulaiman, "Empowering 'Soft' Taliban over 'Hard' Taliban: Pakistan's Counter-terrorism Strategy." *Terrorism Monitor* 6, no. 15 (2008): 25.

⁸ Shamshad Ahmad, "Post-9/11 Foreign Policy of Pakistan." *Criterion Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (2013).

with 3,000 security personnel.⁹ These figures are not undisputed; Haider Iqbal estimated the same as 70,000 people and 8,000 soldiers. The total death toll is much more than deaths in four wars with India together.¹⁰

Pakistan has become number five in the list of most violent states and tenth in the list of most fragile states. The reason behind this hierarchy is the fact that 10,000 people killed in Pakistan in violent incidents in 2010 as compared to 7,123 in Afghanistan and 4,021 in Iraq (The Failed States Index 2010). Pakistan Military Institutions is the most organized and powerful institution of the Pakistan but its General Head Quarter was attacked in October, 2009.

Widespread violence and fragile nature of internal security has made every person in Pakistan an easy target. Ruling elite move here and there in a caravan of security vehicles and during their movements roads close for general public. A clever militant leader can plan to blast bomb amid the crowd of vehicle gathered during such a route. Apart from indiscriminate killings, militancy is playing havoc with the psychology of people. People are living in a state of uncertainty. They don't know while going out of their houses whether they would return alive. This situation is truer for KP where people are suffering more due to proximity of province to Afghanistan.

Enlightened Moderation Failed

⁹ <https://www.dawn.com/news/658004/the-decade-after-911> retrieved as 10 Sep 2011

¹⁰ <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/09/14/pakistan-after-911/> retrieved as 14 Sep 2012

General Musharraf tried to control the situation by creating alternative narrative of Enlightened Moderation. On January 12, 2002 Musharraf gave a policy statement in which he pledged to root out militancy and to restore true image of Pakistan that is "forward looking and moderate Islamic state". Musharraf in his article "A plea for Enlightened Moderation" of June, 2004 said that Islam could get its part glory only if Muslims would individually and socially uplift themselves. Moreover, he also gave the slogan of "Sab sy pehly Pakistan" in an attempt to break from the past slogan of pan Islamism and Afghan brotherhood. But Musharraf failed to check the onslaught of militancy in Pakistan with these slogans.

Pakistan is facing four kinds of militancy

US-Pak partnership increased the proliferation of weapons as well as militancy. Pakistan is currently experiencing four kinds of militancy:

- I. Ethnic Militancy in Sindh where *Pathāns* and *Mohājars* outfits are indulged in power game of capturing resources in the port city of Karachi.
- II. Separatist militancy in Baluchistan where Baloch Sardār with the help of foreign powers are in warfare with the state of Pakistan
- III. Sectarian militancy in which generally Sunni outfits attack Shias. It is spread in the whole country but southern and central Punjab, Karachi and Quetta are the flashpoints of sectarian militancy
- IV. Non State actors, these are militants who were once recruited by the state of Pakistan in its desperate attempts to keep regional balance of powers. These non-state actors have been active in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

War on Terrorism in the region resulted in increase in all kinds of militancy in Pakistan. There is increase in circulation of weapons and new militant ideologies were formed.

Lāl Masjid Operation and resultant backlash

General Zia gave land to Mawlānā Abdullah to form two Madrassas *Hafsa* and *Faridia* with *Lāl Masjid* located in Islamabad. Mawlānā 's two sons, Abul Azīz and Abdul Rashīd Ghāzi were operating the mosque and madrassas. Female students of *Jāmia Hafsa* occupied a children library in Islamabad on January 21, 2007 and demanded:

- I. Islamic system should be enforced in the country
- II. Government should reconstruct the mosques that have been destroyed since 1992 (seven mosques have been destroyed as these were constructed illegally)
- III. Government should check vulgarity in the country.

Government was ready to rebuild mosques but this did not check *Lāl Masjid* students from challenging writ of government. Students, both male and female, visited *Abpara*, a nearby market, in March 2007 and asked hair dressers and shopkeepers of videos to close their shops. But the most shocking incident was that they arrested a woman with her daughter, daughter in law and granddaughter and confined them in *Jāmia Hafsa* as according to the students she was involved in business of prostitution. At this Abdul Rashid Ghazi said Islam orders elimination of evil by force and students did no wrong by arresting a prostitute (A Chronology of *Lāl Masjid* Saga, 2007). This emboldened the students of *Lāl Masjid*. *Burqa* clad women with sticks in their hands would protest on roads of Islamabad for implementation of *Shari'ah* in the country. When

Police arrested some teachers and students of Lāl Masjid, the students arrested four policemen. Not only this, they established their own *Shari'ah* Court within Lāl Masjid and Mawlānā Abdul Aziz threatened to attack the country with terrorist attacks in case the government tried to close the court. On June 23, 2007, the students arrested nine people including seven Chinese citizens from a center of acupuncture on the charges of prostitution. The people were released after protest from China (A Chronology of Lāl Masjid Saga, 2007). The government became the target of criticism and humiliation as it was failing to establish its writ in its own capital.

General Musharraf government started military operation in Lāl Masjid in July 2007 in which many students and teachers, including Ghazi Abdul Rashid, were killed. But Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for this operation. TTP was established after *Lāl Masjid* siege. Attacks on police, and security forces increased many folds. In terrorist and suicide attacks of 2008 alone, 2267 Pakistanis lost their lives. In March 2009 Islamabad police station was attacked. In the same month Police training academy in Lahore was attacked. General Headquarters of army in Rawalpindi became target of Terrorist attacks on 10 October 2009 when ten militants with suicide jacket attacked GHQ and kept it under their siege for hours. This was again a big humiliation for Pakistan as Pakistan Army is the seventh largest Army in the world and commodes were held by 10 terrorists for hours.

***Tehrīk-i-Nifāz-i-Sharī'aht-e-Mohammadī* reactivated**

Another important phenomenon of that period was activities of *Tehrīk-i-Nifāz-i-Sharī'aht-i-Mohammadī* (TNSM) in Swat. TNSM was inactive for some time after its banning by Musharraf government in December 2000

but it reappeared with full vigor after major Earthquake of October 8, 2005 which resulted in much destruction in Kashmir and Northern Areas. Its leaders Sufi Mohammad and his son in law Fazalullāh led a strong campaign for enforcement of *Shari'ah* in Swat (a scenic city of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and spread their message through FM radio (as the organization established its own channels). They dismissed democratic system as un-Islamic. TNSM campaigned for establishment of their own courts which according to it was an effort to bring Islamic Judicial System. Due to activities of TNSM, Swat was becoming hub of militancy and a sanctuary of Tālibān. Government launched operation *Rah-e-Haq* in 2007 that ended in January 2008 but without much success.¹¹

Awamī National Party led Provincial Government signed a deal in April 2008 and another in May 2008 with TSNM to establish peace in the region. According to these deals Sufi Mohammad (who was in jail since 2002) was released. Tālibān would not challenge writ of Pakistan government. Polio vaccination campaigns, barber shops and markets visited by women would not be attacked by Tālibān. There would be no private militias. A fatwa was issued against attacking security forces. Moreover Tālibān would denounce suicide attacks. Tālibān of Swat would condemn robbery, theft and snatching and would help Pakistan government to investigate such incidents. Government was agreed to establish *Shari'ah* in Mālakand Division, pay for compensation of losses during military operation and bring back army from Swat gradually and to review the cases of militants pending in courts.

¹¹Zahid Ali Khan, "Military operations in fata and pata: implications for Pakistan." *Strategic Studies* 32, no. 1 (2012): 129.

As these deals accepted demands of enforcement of *Shari'ah* in Mālakand division, a militant commander Said Jamal declared that *Shari'ah* courts would be established in Swat to settle disputes. Seriousness of Tālibān regarding peace deals could be judged from the fact that two girls schools were burnt hours before signing of this deal, and a policeman was shot dead. As a result of this agreement Fazalullāh was allowed to use FM radio.¹² By entering into peace deal with Tālibān, government endangered those policemen who had been fighting these militants tooth and nail. After peace deal 400 policemen resigned to avoid attacks by militants.

The peace deal only emboldened Tālibān who establishes a parallel system of administration by creating their own courts and enforcing punishments. Pakistan started another operation *Rah-i-Nijat* in 2009.¹³ During the operation local population of Swat withdrew from its area and Pakistan army entered Swat. This operation was successful as militants were either killed or fled from Swat.

Failure of Peace deals with militants

Pakistan incurred the enmity of Tālibān and religious militants. They were attacking Pakistan Government machinery as well as citizens of the state. The military has started many operations against the militants in Federal Administrative Tribal Area (FATA) but failed to root out militancy from the area. Peace deals were signed by the government with the militants to

¹² Basit, Abdul. "Mullah Fazlullah: A Journey from 'FM Mullah' to Head of the Pakistan Taliban." *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 6, no. 10 (2014): 13-16.

¹³ Abbasi, Ishrat Afshan, Mukesh Kumar Khatwani, and Mazher Hussain. "An Overview of Major Military Operations in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan." *Journal of Academic and Social Research* 1, no. 1 (2018): 1-14.

avoid seizures by militants. These Peace deals emboldened the militants resultantly their influence and control over FATA increased, and the writ of State lapsed.

FATA is literally kept outside legal or constitutional frame work of Pakistan. No law or provision of constitution could apply on FATA until so expressed in that particular law or provision. Lawless area of FATA is considered heaven for the terrorists where militants would come to rest to recover, to replenish their revenues, to recruit and to hibernate.¹⁴ In 2002 operation Al-Mizān was started against militants of FATA with 80,000 troops being deployed there.¹⁵ It was first time that military went to FATA after independence in 1947. In March 2004 in village Kaloosha (near Wānā, South Waziristan) military operation was launched but military suffered heavily due to guerrilla war tactics of militants. Public criticism was another factor that led government to seek for peace agreement with militants.¹⁶

Shakai Agreement was signed on March 27, 2004. As agreement was signed when government was in hot waters, it accepted to compensate for casualties as well as for collateral damages. Government promised to let Nek Muhammad (a militant head) as well as foreign militants live peacefully in

¹⁴ Shuja Nawaz, "Countering Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan." (2016).

¹⁵ Seth G Jones, and C. Christine Fair. *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*. RAND Corp Arlington VA National Security Research Div, 2010.

¹⁶ Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, "Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and beyond." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31, no. 9 (2008): 775-807.

Waziristan. In return Mujahedeen would not attack land and security forces of Pakistan and would not be part of any action in Afghanistan.¹⁷

But this agreement could not last even for two months as disagreement over registration of foreign militants and their surrender to government led Pakistan to restart operation on June 11, 2004. Nek Mohammad was killed by US led drone attack on June 19, 2004.¹⁸ The agreement only gave militants time to strengthen themselves.

But government continued to adopt policies of appeasement and signed *Sararogha* peace deal in February 2005 with militant leader Baitullāh Mehsūd. The reason was that Baitullāh Mehsūd was helping Tālibān and under his leadership militancy was spreading to Mehsūd dominated areas of South Waziristan (before that only *Ahmedzai Wazīr* Tribes of South Waziristan were under the influence and control of militants). To bring peace in Mehsūd areas government signed *Sararogha* agreement.¹⁹ According to this agreement past sins of Baitullah were forgiven. Baitullah and his followers would not attack government functionaries or official property. He would not support foreign militants and any culprit found would be handed over to government. But there was no clause regarding

¹⁷Khan Zeb Burki, "Rise of Taliban in Waziristan." *Dialogue (Pakistan)* 5, no. 3 (2010).

¹⁸ Brian Glyn Williams, "The CIA's covert Predator drone war in Pakistan, 2004–2010: the history of an assassination campaign." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 10 (2010): 871-892.

¹⁹ Hassan Abbas, "An assessment of Pakistan's peace agreements with militants in Waziristan (2004-2008)." *The Afghanistan-Pakistan theater: Militant Islam, security & stability* (2010): 7-17.

militant activities in Afghanistan or surrendering/registration of foreign fighters with government. The agreement got disputed when it emerged that money was paid to militants during negotiations.

Militancy has spread from South Waziristan to North Waziristan by 2005 and the writ of the government was limited only to official buildings.²⁰ Government in its attempt to establish peace in North Waziristan signed Miranshah peace accord on September 5, 2006 with *Uthmanzai Wazirs*. According to this deal militants would not :

- I. attack government officials or property
- II. establish parallel administration
- III. involve in militant activities in Afghanistan

Foreign militants (Al Qāidah militants) would either leave North Waziristan or would abide by this peace deal. In return Government would stop all operations against militants and release all captured individuals as well as vehicles and weapons. All newly established check posts on roads would be removed. All issues would resolve according to local traditions. This peace deal remained enforced till May 20, 2007. Government paid indefinite amount to the militants in the name of compensation. Al Qāidah and Tālibān Commander (about 100 in number) were released.²¹

Government started operation *Sirāt-e-Mustaqeem* against Lashkar-e-Islam, a militant organization though not linked with *Tehrīk-e-Tālibān* Pakistan,

²⁰ International Crisis Group. "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: appeasing the militants." *Crisis Group Asia Report* 125 (2006).

²¹ International Crisis Group. "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: appeasing the militants." *Crisis Group Asia Report* 125 (2006).

was involved in sectarian militancy.²² Law and order situation was getting worse due to activities of Lashkar-e-Islam. On June 21, 2008 it captured 16 Christians and operation was started there by military. In the end a peace deal with the name of Khyber Agency Pact was signed. Like earlier deals militants assured neither to attack Pakistan officials nor establish parallel administration or give refuge to foreigners. No propaganda against Pakistan, no training camps for operations against the state, no penetration of militants to Peshawar was assured. But this peace deal was also a failure as five Frontier Corps personnel were killed by militants on the day of signing of peace deal.

Conclusion

All peace deals with militants proved unsuccessful and were followed by restarting of military operation against terrorists. There are various reasons of failure, for example Pakistan military entered into these deals from a position of weakness. Pakistan security forces were in danger of siege whenever such deals were signed. Resultantly militants were always given much freedom to work on a single assurance of not attacking security forces of Pakistan. As a result of peace agreements, militants established parallel system of administration like *Shari'ah* courts, taxation system etc. which was not acceptable to Pakistan.

Second there are various militant organizations working in Pakistan. Ideologically all groups have consensus that Pakistan was fighting a war of USA and that they would fight USA in Afghanistan and if Pakistan would help USA against them, they would fight Pakistan forces as well.

²² Muhammad Feyyaz, "Facets of religious violence in Pakistan." *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 5, no. 2 (2013): 9-13.

Despite this there is no hierarchical set up of militant organization. A peace deal with a militant group was not followed by other groups and attack on security forces continued which sabotaged peace deals.

Third, except Swat agreement with TNSM all agreements were between military and militants. Neither political parties of Pakistan nor USA was taken on board. Due to this reason drone attacks by USA continued to target tribal areas of Pakistan. These attacks not only violated sovereignty of Pakistan but also exposed Pakistan's inability to enforce peace in the area by stopping attacks.

Fourth, peace deals mainly focused on assurance from militants not to attack Pakistan's security forces. There was no mentioning of public welfare projects. Peace deals emboldened the militants and they destroyed public welfare institutions like school, hospitals etc. with impunity. After peace deals with Pakistan, militants did not bother public dissent to their actions. Burning of schools, closing barber shops and CD shops, torturing polio vaccination teams, theft, robbery etc. by militants could not be stopped. Peace could not be arrived at so military operation would have to be restarted.

Fifth the status of peace agreements always remained controversial. These were signed in the places of militant by the government which meant that government was accepting responsibility of the entire crises according to tribal tradition of *Na/nawatey*. Moreover secrecy regarding terms of initial peace deals raised doubts about government's failure to rein in militants through peace deals. Message conveyed was that government had given in so much to militants that by making agreements public, government would invite public criticism.

As a result of peace deals undeclared amount of money was transferred to militants. Many arrested militants were released. They were given almost free hand to work in their respective areas. Result was that power and control of the militants in the area as well as violence would increase after peace deals. Terms of deal like not taking part in activities in Afghanistan or handing over of foreign militants were not followed by militants. Ideologically motivated militants did not believe in borders or countries. For them purpose was *Jihad* against imperialistic forces therefore they continued their violent activities in Afghanistan against USA led forces whenever required. Peace deals with the militants proved a bad idea. Ideologically motivated militants bent upon to establish their own version of Islam and could not be refrained from violence in the name of agreements.